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CASENOTE
Washington Justice Court System-Constitutionality of the Fee
System of Compensating Justices of the Peace.
In the case of In re Borchert1 the Washington Supreme Court decided
that a person tried before an unsalaried justice of the peace on a crimi-
nal charge was not deprived of due process of law because the justice
was compensated on a fee basis. A concurring opinion and two dissent-
ing opinions were written in the 5-to-4 decision.
Richard N. Borchert was arrested by the King County Sheriff for
several traffic violations and taken before an unsalaried justice of the
peace. He challenged the jurisdiction of the court upon the ground
that compensation of the justice on a fee basis under RCW 3.16.070
gave the justice a direct, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him and thereby denied him due process of law in
violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Borchert refused a change of venue to a salaried justice which was
offered by the presiding justice. He was found guilty, fined and jailed.
He sought a writ of habeas corpus in superior court on the same grounds
raised in the justice court. The writ was granted and this appeal was
brought.
Borchert's position was that the fee system of compensating justices
of the peace renders them pecuniarily interested in the outcome of cases
before them in two primary ways. First, the justices have opportunity
to collect several fees only if they convict. Under RCW 3.16.070 an
unsalaried justice of the peace may receive one or more of the follow-
ing fees if a defendant convicted before him is jailed and/or appeals:
for transcript of judgment-$1.00 (a transcript of judgment is neces-
sary for appeal2 and is paid for by the appealing party3); for commit-
ting to jail-$.50; for taking recognizance of bal-$.75. As respond-
ent's brief points out, "This means for every conviction in which the
defendant is either sent to jail or desires to appeal or both, the justice
receives besides the $2.00 filing fee anywhere from 503 to $2.25 per case
-which would not be received upon an acquittal."' Second, because
1157 Wash. Dec. 624, 359 P2d 789 (1961).
2 RCW 10.10.040.
3 RCW 3.16.070.
&Brief for Respondent, p. 11.
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police officers tend to take cases before justices evidencing a strong
tendency to convict and because the income of unsalaried justices of the
peace is directly proportional to their volume of cases, the justice is
motivated to maintain a high conviction rate in order to develop a work-
ing relationship with the police.'
The court relied primarily on three grounds in reaching the decision:
(1) Trial before an unsalaried justice of the peace in Washington does
not deny a defendant due process of law because several procedural
safeguards are available to him. (2) Borchert's challenge to the court's
jurisdiction was based on a charge of bias and was improperly made
because bias of a judge goes not to his jurisdiction, but to the venue and
the venue was not challenged. (3) Since Borchert refused a proffered
change of venue to a salaried justice, he waived his right to be tried
before a disinterested court.
In contending that he was denied due process of law, Borchert relied
largely upon the leading case of Tumey v. Ohio.6 There the Supreme
Court of the United States held that a person tried before a court, the
judge of which had a direct and substantial pecuniary interest against
him because collection of his fees was dependent upon conviction, was
deprived of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
The Washington court, however, refused to apply the rule of the
Tumey case, distinguishing it from the present case largely on the basis
of procedural safeguards extant in Washington which were not avail-
able under Ohio law. The court advanced five distinctions.
1. Fee justices were not authorized by the Ohio constitution while
they are authorized by the Washington constitution.7
2. In Tumey, there was no right to jury trial whereas in Washington
this right is guaranteed by statute.8
3. While Tumey had no right to a change of venue, such right is
5 The two halves of this theory have been elaborated upon in these ways: "It re-
quires more naivete than I can muster to believe that police officers who feel that they
have apprehended a guilty person would not, when allowed freedom of choice, be more
likely to select a justice of the peace who is prone to convict." In re Borchert, 157
Wash. Dec. 624, 656 & n.17, 359 P.2d 789, 807 & n.4 (1961) (dissenting opinon of
Finley, C.J.). "[T]he temptation to tip the balance in favor of the state is nourished
not only by the opportunity to double the fee, but also by the knowledge that the entire
source of revenue can be cut off at the whim of the arresting officer." In re Borchert,
memorandum opinion of James, J., Superior Court of the State of Washington for
King County. See RCW 46.64.010, .015. But compare, RCW 3.20.131, 46.52.100.6273 U.S. 510 (1927).
7 See WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
8 RCW 10.04.050.
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guaranteed in Washington where the defendant fears the judge is not
impartial.'
4. The right to appellate review in Ohio was restricted to questions
of law only, while in Washington, the right to appeal with trial de novo
is provided.1"
5. In Tumey, the judge's compensation was entirely dependent upon
conviction, while in Washington, the judge is compensated by the
county even though there is an acquittal. 1
A careful analysis of the majority opinion, the Tumey decision, and
recent treatment by other states, reveals a number of weaknesses in
the Washington court's approach to the due process issue.
The majority regards as significant the fact that the Washington fee
justice courts are authorized by the state constitution whereas the
offending tribunal in Tumey was not. It is submitted that this is a
distinction without a significant legal difference.
As the Tumey decision itself indicates, a judicial system giving a
judge a pecuniary interest in cases before him is no less repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States when founded upon a state con-
stitution than when founded upon a state statute. 2
Judge Foster points out in his dissent that for purposes of determin-
ing whether a law infringes a federal constitutional right, it does not
matter whether that law has as its source a state statute or a state con-
stitution." Article VI, Clause 2 of the federal constitution clearly
supports this view.'4 The principle has been definitively stated by the
United States Supreme Court. 5
The Washington court's view does receive some support from several
decisions by other state courts which were rendered soon after the
Tumey decision in 1927.16 In these cases, of which Moulton v. Byrd"
1) RCW 3.20.100.
10 RCW 10.10.010.
31 RCW 10A6.210.
12 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927) (by implication).
1s Ins re Borchert, 157 Wash. Dec. 624, 638-39, 359 P.2d 789, 797 (1961).
""This constitution and the laws of the United States. . . shall be the supreme law
of the land; ... any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary not-
withstanding."
'5 "For the protection of the Federal Constitution applied, whatever the form in
which the legislative power of the state is executed; that is, whether it be by a consti-
tution, an act of the legislature, or an act of any subordinate instrumentality of the
state ... " Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571, 577 (1919). Cf.,
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ; Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195 (1914).
16 Cf., Moulton v. Byrd, 224 Ala. 403, 140 So. 384 (1932) ; See also, Jordan v. State,
172 Ga. 857, 159 S.E. 235 (1931); Harding v. Minas, 206 Ind. 661, 190 N.E. 862(1934) ; State v. Schelton, 205 Ind. 416, 186 N..E 772 (1933) ; Hitt v. State, 149 Miss.
718, 115 So. 879 (1928).
17 224 Ala. 403, 140 So. 384 (1932).
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is typical, the courts reasoned that the Tumey case (outside of its orig-
inal facts) was insufficient to overcome the concept of due process
dictated by the state constitution, legislature and judiciary. None of the
cases dealing with this point reached the Supreme Court. The view
which they express was thought by one legal analyst to be extinct.18
A procedural safeguard set forth by the majority as distinguishing
the Tumey case is the defendant's right in Washington, to demand a
trial by jury. Cases from other jurisdictions conflict on the significance
of this point. Several early decisions in other states support the major-
ity's position.19 However a West Virginia case, Williams v. Brannen,"
quoting from the Supreme Court, takes the position that " 'Trial by
jury,' in the constitutional sense, requires such a trial to be under the
superintendence of a disinterested judge."'" A passage quoted by
Judge Foster in a footnote to his dissent is perhaps pertinent. "It is
difficult, however, to understand how [a right to trial by jury] ...
would protect the defendant from a partial tribunal. The justice...
would still be the presiding officer of the court, with the same powers to
instruct the jury, decide on admissabilify [sic] of evidence, and rule
on motions."2
The majority also cites the defendant's right to a change of venue
if he believes the justice to be partial." As will be pointed out below, 21
there is substantial authority that the pecuniary interest of a judge is
a disqualifying factor which goes to the jurisdiction and not to the
venue. It is questionable whether this jurisdictional defect is cured by
the defendant's unexercised right to remove the case to another court,
if the interested judge actually decides the case.
There is also a practical limitation upon the efficacy of a right to a
change of venue in the normal case. As pointed out in a similar con-
text in a Kentucky case,2" and a federal case, 6 the ordinary person is
18 See, Lee, 7e Emergence and Evolution of a Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial
Before a Justice of the Peace, 20 FED. B.J. 111, 120 (1960), which disposes of that
view with the statement, "The arguments advanced... are not considered today."
19 State v. Schelton, 205 Ind. 416, 186 N.E. 772 (1933). Cf., Ex parte Steel, 220
N.C. 685, 18 S.E.2d 132 (1942).
20 116 W. Va. 1, 178 S.E. 67 (1935).
21 Id. at 3, 178 S.E. at 69.
22 In re Borchert, 157 Wash. Dec. 624, 648 & n.13, 359 P.2d 789, 803 & n.12 (1961)
(dissenting opinion of Foster, J.), quoting from 10 IND. L.J. 320 (1933).
23 It may be noted that the statute relied upon here by the Washington court may
provide no relief to the defendant seeking a disinterested court, because it allows a
transfer of venue only to the next nearest justice court, which may also be presided
over by an unsalaried justice of the peace. See RCW 3.20.100.
24 Infra, p. 526-28.
25 Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956).
26 Ex parte Baer, 20 F.2d 912 (E.D. Ky. 1927).
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not aware of his right to object; he assumes that the court before
which he has been taken is a lawfully constituted one. It is not un-
reasonable for a defendant to expect an impartial tribunal in the first
instance.
A similar criticism may be made of the majority's fourth distinction,
the existence of a right of appeal to a superior court with trial de novo.
There is a group of early state court cases distinguishing Tumey from
their local court systems upon this same ground.27 However the West
Virginia and Kentucky courts have vigorously rejected the argument
that such a right of appeal affords due process, though the original
tribunal may be pecuniarily interested.28 The question may be posed
whether due process is achieved when a defendant must try his case
twice in order to receive a decision from an assuredly impartial tribunal,
a procedure likely to be costly to him in both time and money.
An attempt is also made to distinguish Tumey on the ground that
the fee justice would receive compensation from the county regardless
of the result reached in cases before him. 9 Here, for a fleeting instant,
the Washington court touches upon and leaves what seems to be the
crucial issue of the case-does the Washington system of compensating
unsalaried justices of the peace on a fee basis provide them with a
direct and substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of the cases
before them as that system is interpreted in the light of the Tumey
opinion?
Although unsalaried justices do receive their fees from the county
if they acquit, Borchert objected to two additional features of the
system which he contended provide the justices with such a direct and
substantial interest. Briefly, again, they were that by convicting, a
justice gains the opportunity to collect additional fees and also makes
his court more attractive to conviction-minded police officers.
The fact that these features of the system were regarded as highly
significant by the four dissenting judges and have been censured by at
27 Hill v. State, 174 Ark. 886, 298 S.W. 321 (1927); State v. Gonzales, 43 N.M.
498, 95 P.2d 673 (1939) ; Ex parte Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E. 2d 132 (1942) ; cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 686 (1942).
2s Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956) ; Williams v. Brannen, 116 W. Va. 1,
178 S.E. 67 (1935).29 Although this is the language used by the court, it is not strictly correct. The un-
salaried justice of the peace may deduct his fees from any fines levied, see RCW
10.04.110, 3.16.160; Ors. ATr'y. GEr. 178 (Wash. 1919-20), but upon acquittal must
submit a cost bill to the county. See RCW 10.46.210. This procedure necessarily re-
sults in some inconvenience, delay in payment, and additional administrative expense
for the justice of the peace. These factors were pointed out in respondent's brief, page
12, but were not mentioned by the court.
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least one legal writer indicates that they are of some consequence."
They have been a subject of general criticism for a number of years.3
These factors formed the basis upon which the superior court judge
granted the writ of habeas corpus applied for and constituted the main-
stays of Borchert's entire case. Yet the majority disposed of these
factors, and the issues which they raised, by virtually ignoring them.
A careful reading of the Tumey decision and subsequent references
thereto by the Supreme Court indicates that where a judicial system
does provide a judge with a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in
the outcome of cases before him, to attempt to distinguish theTumey
case because more extensive procedural safeguards are available than
those existing in its fact pattern is to ignore the fundamental policy
underlying that decision.
The Tumey opinion placed little emphasis on the lack of pro-
cedural safeguards as found in Washington, the presence of which the
Washington majority regards as controlling. Rather, the basic evil at
which the Tumey decision struck was the presiding judge's direct,
personal and substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case
before him.
The Tumey decision defines a primary concept of due process of
law, a concept contained in the following passages. "[I]t certainly
violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to
the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, sub-
stantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him ....
Even more broadly, "Every procedure which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold
30 Stevens, Washington State Courts with Criminal Jurisdiction: The Law and
Some Problems (1957). (Unpublished article in University of Washington Law
School Library.)
31 This criticism has resulted in some legislative action. After a four-year study, the
Washington Legislative Council proposed a complete reorganization of the justice
court system designed to accomplish, among other things, the elimination of the fea-
tures which were objected to by Borchert. After extensive amendment, this proposal
eventually resulted in the passage of chapter 299, Session Laws of 1961, which places
justices of the peace covered by the act on a salary basis. It also contains new venue
restrictions limiting the power of police to choose the justice court in which they will
bring cases. However, the very limited application of this act leaves a large number
of justices of the peace on an unsalaried basis and operating under the original fee
provisions. The act is mandatory in only three counties-King, Pierce and Spokane.
Other counties may elect to come under the act by a majority vote of their county
commissioners. For comment on this legislation, see Stevens, Judicial Administratioii,
Survey of Washington Legislation-1961, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 297 (1961).
32 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
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the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law."3
In looking to the settled modes and usages of procedure existing in
the English common law to establish the standard for procedural due
process of law, Chief Justice Taft found that "indeed, in analagous
cases it is very clear that the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer,
judicial or quasijudicial, in the resolving of the subject matter which
he was to decide, rendered the decision voidable."3 "There was at
the common law the greatest sensitiveness over the existence of any
pecuniary interest, however small or infinitesimal, in the justices of the
peace. , 53
A reading of the entire Tumey opinion clearly indicates that the
Court was satisfied that the pecuniary interest factor alone constituted
a fatal denial of due process of law. It appears that in noting the other
procedural defects, the court was simply adding supporting evidence to
a foregone conclusion. 8
In a more recent (1955) case, In re Murchison,37 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the view of the Tumey decision regarding the pecuniarily
interested judge. The court there added, "Such a stringent rule may
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias .... But to
perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice.' ""s
Does a court system containing features such as those raised by
Borchert, involving such an inherent proclivity toward partiality on
the part of the justices constitute a "procedure which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden
of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not
to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the
accused ... "?" Does it provide an unsalaried justice with "a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against [the defendant] ... "?"6 With particular reference to the jus-
tice's reliance for income upon cases filed by the police, does this factor
provide him with a "direct dependence ... upon convictions for com-
83 Id. at 532.
34 Id. at 524.
35 Id. at 525.
386 See Lee, The Emergence and Evolution of a Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial
Before a Justice of the Peace, 20 FED. B.J. 111, 121 (1960).
37349 U.S. 133 (1955).
38 Id. at 136.39 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).40 Id. at 523.
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pensation for his services as a judge.. ."4 -the feature which the
Supreme Court found objectionable in the Tumey case?
Answers to these questions are not free from doubt. The appellant
argued strongly that for constitutional purposes they should be an-
swered in the negative, contending that any interest created in the
justices by the fee system is so indirect and remote as to be imaginary
only.4
2
However, the possibility that the above features of the system could
influence the unsalaried justice of the peace is clear. The constitutional
significance of this possibility is a question which should be judicially
determined through application of the tests set forth in Tumey. An-
swers to these questions are necessary to a complete determination of
the case. Answers of, "no" would render any further consideration of
the case unnecessary. If the answer to any one question is "yes," then
it is difficult indeed to avoid application of the Tumey case to the
present facts. The Washington court provided no such answers.
The Washington court's preoccupation with distinguishing away
Tumey seems to have caused it to ignore the fundamental policy ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court regarding the interested judge. Thus,
no application of that policy to the case at hand was made.
It is interesting to note that the majority has incorporated into its
opinion almost every device by which state courts have sought to avoid
the application of Tumey to local fee justice systems since that opinion
was rendered." Considered individually, these grounds are less than
convincing. Though they have been accepted by some courts, they
have been rejected by others. Do they attain cumulatively what they
seem to fall short of individually? Since none of the cases utilizing
them has reached the Supreme Court, the question is open. Close
scrutiny of the Tumey opinion suggests that they do not if a direct and
substantial pecuniary interest is conceded to exist in the judge.
The Washington court also disposed of Borchert on the ground that
his objections were properly directed only to the venue and that in
refusing a change of venue, he waived any lack of due process.
41 Dugan v. State, 277 U.S. 61, 64 (1928). In Dugan v. State, the Supreme Court
re-emphasized the pecuniary interest factor in the Tuiney case, but distinguished the
case then under consideration on the primary ground that the pecuniary interest of the
judge in question was too indirect and remote to constitute a denial of due process.
For a comparison of these cases, see, DOWLING & EDwARDS, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 605 (1954).
42 See Brief for Appellant.
43 See Lee, 77Te Emergence and Evolution of a Constitutional Right to a Pair Trial
Before a Justice of the Peace. 20 FED. B.J. 111 (1960).
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In this disposal of the case on the basis of rules concerning a biased
judge, the court appears to have misconceived the issue. The problem
presented by this case is one of the disqualification of unsalaried jus-
tices of the peace by reason of their pecuniary interest, as distinguished
from bias. The questions of the bias of a judge and the pecuniary
interest of a judge in the outcome of the case before him are quite
different both on analysis and in their legal consequences.
The doctrines surrounding the issue of the interested judge stem
from the universally recognized principle that no man can be judge of
his own cause."' The general rule is well settled that a direct pecuniary
interest in the subject matter of a suit will disqualify a judge from act-
ing therein."5 Basically, he must stand to gain or lose financially de-
pending upon which way a case before him is decided.
On the other hand, bias refers to the existence of an actual state of
mind on the part of the judge-an existing opinion on his part regard-
ing one of the parties to an action which strongly militates either for or
against that party. "The words bias and prejudice ... refer to the
mental attitude or disposition of the judge towards a party to the litiga-
tion." 6 ... "Bias and prejudice mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will
toward one of the litigants, or undue favoritism or friendship toward
one. 
4 7
The distinction between bias and interest is clearly recognized by the
Supreme Court in In re Murchison. " [N]o man is permitted to try
cases where he has an interest in the outcome .... Such a stringent rule
may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias .... 2 8
Decisions in Washington are in agreement that where a party be-
lieves the court to be biased against him, he has the privilege of demand-
ing a change of venue. 9 If he fails to seek a change of venue before a
decision is made, he is held to have waived the disqualification, and
the judgment of the court, though erroneous, is not void.5" It is this
44See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) ; 48 C.J.S. Judges § 78 (1947).
45 See 48 C..S. Judges § 78 (1947) for a collection of cases on this point.46 Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 325, 67 S.W.2d 191, 192 (1933). Accord, Evans
v: Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 372, 290 Pac. 662 (1930) ; Tuttle v. Tuttle, 48 N.D.
10, 181 N.W. 898 (1M2). Cf., State v. Waterman, 36 Idaho 259, 210 Pac. 208 (1922).
-'7 Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 20, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948). Cf., In re Hale's
Estate, 231 Ia. 1018, 2 N.W.2d -775 (1942). See also these Washington cases, State v.
Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51, 215 Pac. 41 (1923) ; State ex rel. Stevens v. Superior Court,
82 Wash. 420, 144 Pac. 539 (1914).
48 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). See Tuttle v. Tuttle, 48 N.D. 10, 181 N.W. 898 (1921)
(on petition for rehearing).
49 State v. Clark, 125 Wash. 294, 216 Pac. 17 (1923); State v. Vanderveer, 115
Wash. 184, 196 Pac. 650 (1921).50 State v. Clark, 125 Wash. 294, 216 Pac. 17 (1923) ; State v. Vanderveer, 115
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analysis which the court applies; writing the opinion as if Borchert
had alleged bias instead of interest.
Where the disqualification of the judge is the result of his having
a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, however, there is
authority that such a disqualification affects the court's jurisdiction, in
addition to the venue, rendering the acts of the judge void.51 This con-
clusion has been reached because disqualification by interest is a
matter of public policy,52 and on the basis of statutory disqualification
of the interested judge." No Washington cases deal with this point. 4
Thus, under the analysis of most opinions dealing with the pecuniary
interest of a judge, Borchert's challenge to the jurisdiction of the
court, rather than the venue, was entirely proper. Borchert waived
nothing by refusing a change of venue, having made a timely and
proper objection to the court's jurisdiction.
The concurring opinion is almost entirely devoted to establishing
the fee justice courts as constitutional under the state constitution.
This point was not in issue in the case and it is difficult to see to what
end it is raised by the concurring judge. The concurring opinion in
part contains a statement which appears in essence effectively to
undermine the position of the majority on the due process question.
It states, "The system is not a model one. Under present conditions,
it does not approach minimum standards for the administration of
justice."55 (Emphasis added.) It is difficult to regard a judicial system
which "does not approach minimum standards for the administration
of justice" as affording due process of law to a defendant tried
thereunder.
However questionable the grounds, by this decision the Washington
court has closed the door to reformation of the fee justice system by
Wash. 184, 196 Pac. 650 (1921) ; State ex rel. Stevens v. Superior Court, 82 Wash.
420, 144 Pac. 539 (1914). See Krebs v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 7 Cal.2d 547, 61 P.2d
931 (1936) ; Montalto v. State, 51 Ohio App. 6, 199 N.E. 198 (1935).
51 Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956). Cf., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927). See also 48 C.J.S. Judges § 95 (1947) ; 30A AM. JuR. Judges § 210 (1958).
52 State ex rel Richardson v. Keen, 185 Okla. 539, 95 P.2d 120 (1939).
53 Postal Mut. Indem. Co. v. Ellis, 140 Tex. 570, 169 S.W.2d 482 (1943). It is
notable that Washington has such a statute. RCW 2.28.030 provides, "[a judicial
officer] shall not act as such... in an action ... in which he is directly interested." No
mention of this statute was made by the Washington court.
54 Though cases in some jurisdictions may be found which appear to take a contrary
position, generally they concern a complete failure to raise the interest issue. E.g.,
Brown v. State, 149 Miss. 219, 115 So. 436 (1928) ; Tari v. State, 117 Ohio 481, 159
N.E. 594 (1927). Borchert did make a timely objection to the justice's alleged interest,
though his challenge was to the jurisdiction rather than to the venue.
55 In re Borchert, 157 Wash. Dec. 624, 632, 359 P.2d 789, 794 (1961) (concurring
opinion of Weaver, J.).
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state judicial action. It now appears unlikely that the case will be
appealed. Removal of the features of the system to which Borchert
objected must now be accomplished, if at all, by more affirmative
legislation than was enacted during the 1961 session 7 or through
action by individual counties, under the terms of that legislation.58
FoRuRST W. WALLS
5 Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was filed on June 13,
1961, and the record was filed with the clerk of that court on July 26, 1961. However,
the case had not been docketed as of November 1, 1961. (Rule 13 of the Revised Rules
of the Supreme Court requires the appealing party to docket the case with the Court
within 60 days of filing of the notice of appeal.) Counsel for Borchert have indicated
that no further action is contemplated.
57 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 299. See note 31 supra for discussion of this legisla-
tion.
58 Ibid.
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